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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RULON ROMRELL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
W. W. CLYDE & COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. J 
Case No. 
13801 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Notwithstanding the fact the Appellant-Contractor, 
W. W. Clyde, cut a drainage ditch under a fence, which 
it had also constructed, in accordance with the plans 
and specifications of its contract with the State of Utah, 
and in the presence of the State Inspector, who approved 
the work, Respondent, Rulon Romrell, alleged that Ap-
pellant-Contractor, W. W. Clyde, negligently undermined 
a fence "which surrounded an area where his Charlois 
bull and Hereford cow were located, and as a result the 
animals were able to crawl under the fence" where it was 
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"undermined" and said animals got into a pasture of 
alfalfa where they bloated and died (Plaintiff's Com-
plaint). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury in the District Court 
of Utah County with the Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
presiding. The jury returned a veaxlict in favor of the 
Plaintiff-Respondent and against the Appellant-Contrac-
tor on the Second Cause of Action in the sum of One 
Thousand Nine Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($1,900.00), 
together with costs in the sum of Ninety-five and 80/100 
Dollars ($95.80), and Judgment was entered accordingly. 
The First Cause of Action, chiming damage of Four Hun-
dred Dollars ($400.00) for the loss of a Hereford cow 
which is not the subject of this appeal, was dismissed by 
jury, no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment entered 
below by the trial court with respect to the Second Cause 
of Action for One Thousand Nine Hundred and No/100 
($1,900.00), plus costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant is a corporation engaged in the construc-
tion business. Respondent is an individual engaged in 
farming and a small cattle operation. 
On August 22, 1972, Respondent alleges that his 
Charlois bull, valued at One Thousand Five Hundred and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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No/100 Dollars ($1,500.00) and his Hereford cow, valued 
at Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00), crawled under a 
fence, which was installed by agents of the Appellant 
(a subcontractor) at a location where Appellant had 
"undermined" the fence, and got into an alfalfa field 
where they bloated and died. 
The construction of the fence and drainage ditch 
under the fence at the point where the Charlois bull and 
the Hereford caw allegedly got out was part of a con-
struction project entitled "Bluffdale Road to Alpine" 
which was opened for bid by the State of Utah on April 
27, 1971 (Tr. 61 - p. 2, lines 22-25), and on which the 
Appellant, who was awarded the project, commenced 
work on May 21, 1971 (Tr. 61 - p, 3, lines 12-16). The 
entire construction project had not been completed at 
the time of trial on May 31, 1974, and the State Inspec-
tor, Clifford Corless, testified that his "final inspection", 
which occurs when the project is completed, would be 
"some time to come" in the future (Tr. 61 - p. 43, lines 
1230 and p. 44, lines 1-10). Obviously, however, there 
were many parts of the project which had been completed, 
in and of themselves, although the entire project had not 
been completed. 
The "undermining" of the fence, alleged by Respon-
dent, concerned a drainage ditch which was in fact dug 
at Station 143 by an agent of Appellant (subcontractor) 
in the presence of an employee of Appellant and the 
State Inspector, Clifford Corless, on May 22, 1972 (Tr. 
61 - p. 36, line 30 and p. 37, lines 1-8). The Project En-
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gineer, Phillip Lundell, testified that the drainage ditch 
was in the State's original plans and specifications (Tr. 
61 - p. 14, lines 29-30 and p. 15, lines 1-6). The State, 
through its agents, staked the drainage ditch on May 4, 
1972, directed the Appellant-Contractor to cut it under 
the fence, and the work was done on May 22, 1972, in 
the presence of the State Inspector, Clifford Corless (Tr. 
61 - p. 15, lines 17-20). Corless testified that the drainage 
ditch was cut in accordance with the State's plans and 
and specifications and that the work was completed in 
his presence on May 22, 1972 (Tr. 61 - p. 36, line 30 and 
p. 37, lines 1-8), which was three months before the 
Respondent's bull and cow allegedly got under the fence 
through the drainage ditch on August 22, 1972. 
In regard to the fence at Station 143 where the drain-
age ditch was cut, Clifford Corless, the State Inspector, 
testified that based on his own personal observation on 
May 22, 1972, the fence was constructed in accordance 
with the plans and specifications of the State, that no 
damage had been done to the fence in digging the drain-
age ditch and that the work on the fence was complete 
as of that date, May 22, 1972 (Tr. 61 - p. 33, lines 6-30 
and p, 34, lines 1-2). 
Actually, the fence at Station 143 was part of some 
3,600 feet of fence which had been constructed by an 
agent of the Appellant-Contractor (subcontractor) which, 
according to Phillip Lundell, the Project Engineer, had 
been completed since the fall of 1971, about one year 
prior to the incident concerning the Respondent's bull 
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and cow on August 22, 19727 (Tr. 61 - p. 9, lines 17-30 
and p. 10, line 13). The Appellant-Contractor did not 
perform any more work on the fence after the fall of 
1971 (Tr. 61 - p. 14, lines 14-16) since the work was com-
pleted as was confirmed by the State Inspector, Clifford 
Corless, when he observed the digging of the drainage 
ditch on May 22, 1972. 
After May 22, 1972, there apparently was some ero-
sion in the area where the drainage ditch was cut under 
the fence such that on August 22,1972, some three months 
after the Appellant-Contractor had completed its work on 
the drainage ditch in the presence of and under the di-
rection of the State Inspector, Clifford Corless, who ac-
cepted the work as having been done in accordance with 
the plans and specifications of the State of Utah, the 
Plaintiff-Respondent's Charlois bull and Hereford cow 
allegedly got under the fence and went into an alfalfa 
field where they bloated and died. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE AP-
PELLANT-CONTRACTOR WAS NOT NEG-
LIGENT BECAUSE THE WORK WAS DONE 
BY THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLANS AND 
SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE WORK AS 
PROVIDED BY THE STATE OF UTAH. 
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POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE COURT DETERMINED 
THAT THERE WAS A JURY QUESTION 
AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE APPEL-
LANT-CONTRACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN 
NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO FOLLOW 
THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, THE COURT 
ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW THAT THERE HAD BEEN 
A PRACTICAL ACCEPTANCE BY THE 
STATE OF UTAH OF THE WORK DONE 
BY THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR 
WHICH SHIFTS THE RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR MAINTAINING THE WORK FROM 
THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR TO THE 
STATE OF UTAH AND MAKES THE STATE 
OF UTAH LIABLE TO THIRD PARTIES 
SUCH AS PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT FOR 
ANY INJURIES OR DAMAGE SUFFERED 
BY REASON OF THE WORK. 
The law in the subject case is clear but its applica-
tion depends on whether or not the work performed by 
the contractor was negligently done. 
(1) If the contractor was not negligent in perform-
ing the work, then the law is that a contractor is not 
liable to a third person receiving injury or damage where 
the contractor has performed the work in accordance 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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with the plans and specifications. Black v. Peter Kiewit 
Sons', Inc., 94 Ida. 755, 497 P. 2d (1972), (Court stated 
"This general rule is applicable in Idaho where this court 
has held that if a contractor performs his work according 
to the plans and specifications, no liability may be im-
posed upon him for any damage resulting from such con-
struction"). See 13 A. L. R. 2d 195 and 58 A. L. R. 2d 
869 for a compilation of cases in support of this rule of 
law. 
(2) If the contractor was negligent in performing 
the work, then the law is that a contractor is not liable 
to a third person receiving injury or damage as a result 
of the negligent construction of the work, after comple-
tion and acceptance thereof by the owner or contractee 
(the State in the case at bar) and such law does not 
require a formal acceptance of the contractor's work since 
liability of the contractor ceases with a practical accept-
ance after completion. Black v. Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc., 
supra. See 13 A. L. R. 2d 195 at 211 to 212 and 58 A. L. 
R. 2d 869 at 876 to 878 and supplements thereto for a 
compilation of cases in support of this rule of law. 
The first matter the Court must consider is what 
questions it is supposed to determine in a negligence 
action. The Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, 
§ 328 B, expressly states that: 
"In an action for negligence the court deter-
mines: (a) whether the evidence as to the facts 
makes an issue upon which the jury may rea-
sonably find the existence or non-existence of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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such facts; and (b) whether such facts give rise 
to any legal duty on the part of the defendant; 
• • • 
Therefore, assuming for the moment that there are 
factual issues, the court must determine whether such 
facts, assuming they are resolved in favor of the plaintiff, 
give rise to a legal duty on the part of the defendant 
contractor. 
In the typical automobile accident case, the court 
determines that the driver of a motor vehicle has a duty 
of due care toward all persons who may be injured or 
damaged by the use of such motor vehicle from the time 
the driver commences use of such motor vehicle until the 
time such use comes to an end or the drive is completed. 
In the case at bar then, the count must determine when 
the duty of the contractor to third persons begins and 
when such duty ends. It is submitted that based upon 
the above, the contractor's duty to third persons begins 
when the contractor commences the construction work 
and it ends when the work is satisfactorily completed or 
when there is a practical acceptance of the work. 
Now, in the case at bar, as in a typical automobile 
accident case, the Plaintiff-Respondent has the burden 
of placing into evidence facts which are sufficient to give 
rise to a legal duty owed by the Appellant-Contractor 
to the Plaintiff-Respondent, a third party. In order to 
do so, Plaintiff-Respondent must introduce facts which 
show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Ap-
pellant-Contractor was negligent and that, at the time 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of Plaintiff-Respondent's damage, the Appellant-Con-
tractor was still in charge and control of the work and 
that the work itself had not been satisfactorily com-
pleted, turned over to or accepted by the State. In other 
words, even if the Plaintiff-Respondent's evidence is suf-
ficient to show that the Appellant-Contractor was negli-
gent in performing the work, the Plaintiff-Respondent 
must also have evidence sufficient; to show that there 
had not been a satisfactory completion or practical ac-
ceptance of the work by the State because at the point 
where there is a satisfactory completion or practical ac-
ceptance of the work by the State, the Appellant-Con-
tractor's duty to third persons ceases and the State's 
duty to the third persons begins. The Court must de-
termine whether or not there is sufficient evidence in 
the record to meet Plaintiff-Respondent's burden. 
Before going to the record, however, i,h** following 
three cases should be noted which support tin- above 
recitation of the function of the court, ans Lin- burden 
of the plaintiff. 
In Haynes v. Norfolk Bridge and Construction Com-
pany, 126 Neb. 281, 253 N. W. 344 (1934), where defen-
dant contractor had completed its work on a highway 
for the State, prior to the accident, and did no further 
work therafter on the area where the accident occurred 
and there was no further work for the contractor to do, 
the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the burden was 
upon the plaintiff to establish that the contractor was 
yet in charge and control of the work at the time of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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accident, and, having failed in this regard, there was no 
evidence that would warrant submitting the question 
to the jury. 
In Rengstorf v. Winston Bros. Co., 167 Minn. 290, 
208 N. W. 995 (1926), the court held that there was 
nothing in that case to impose a duty upon the defen-
dant [a grading contractor] to place guard rails along 
both sides of a road or to illuminate it. "To hold other-
wise," the opinion reads, "we would have to say that a 
jury might properly place upon a grading contractor, 
where the controlling authority of the State has subjected 
his completed work to public use, after its satisfactory 
completion, but before its formal acceptance, responsi-
bility for failure to illuminate and equip it with guard 
rails. The result is impossible." 
In Reynolds v. Manley, 223 Ark. 314, 265 S. W. 2d 
714 (1954), the court held that the contractor was not 
liable to a third party injured as a result of certain work 
performed by the contractor where the state highway 
department was present when the construction work 
was being done, that it not only knew how it was being 
done, but actually directed what materials to use and it 
approved and accepted the work with full knowledge. 
Now, keeping in mind that the Court must deter-
mine whether or not Plaintiff-Respondent has met his 
burden of showing that the Appellant-Contractor was 
negligent in performing the work and that the Appellant-
Contractor was still in charge and control of the work 
at the time Plaintiff-Respondent suffered damages on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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August 22, 1972, and that there had not been a satis-
factory completion or practical acceptance of the work 
by the State, let us go to the record to see what the facts 
really show. The record submitted is that of the two 
State officials, Phillip Lundell, the Project Engineer, 
and Clifford Corless, the State Inspector, both of whom 
testified concerning the Appellant-Contractor's work and 
specifically as to whether or not it had been done in 
accordance with the plans and specifications and whether 
or not the Appellant-Contractor was still in charge and 
control of the work and whether or not the work had 
been satisfactorily completed, turned over to and ac-
cepted (practically, not formally) by the State. There 
are no other witnesses who could better testify as to 
these facts since it is the State to whom the duty to 
third persons shifts upon satisfactory completion or prac-
tical acceptance of the work. 
The work in question consists of a fence and a drain-
age ditch cut underneath the fence. According to the 
testimony of Phillip Lundell, the Project Engineer, (Tr. 
61 - p. 1, lines 26-29 and p. 2, lines 7-12) the Appellant-
Contractor installed a fence from Station 149 to Station 
133 + 50 on June 1, 1971 (Tr. 61 - p. 6, lines 8-9). The 
distance from one Station to another is 100 feet (Tr. 61 
- p. 5, lines 16-17). Therefore, from Station 149 to Sta-
tion 133 + 50 would be about 1,650 feet. About a week 
after June 12, 1971, the fence was continued up to Sta-
tion 114, or an additional 1,950 feet (Tr. 61 p. 7, lines 
24-29). All of this fencing, approximately 3,600 feet, was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
completed by early fall of 1971 (Tr. 61 - p. 9, lines 17-30 
and p. 10, line 13). The Appellant-Contractor did not 
perform any more work on the fence after the fall of 1971 
(Tr. 61 - p. 14, lines 14-16). As far as the fence is con-
cerned then, it was completed in the early fall; the posts 
had been cemented and the fence had been tied down 
both along the level ground and in the washes; and there 
was nothing left for the Appellant-Contractor to do on 
the fence. It had been satisfactorily completed. 
The particular part of the work which allegedly 
caused damage to Plaintiff-Respondent by reason of his 
bull and cow getting out on August 22, 1972, was at Sta-
tion 143 where a drainage ditch had been cut under the 
fence. According to the books and records of the State, 
which are kept in the normal course of business (Tr. 61 
- p. 27, line 30 and p. 28, lines 1-4), and according to Mr. 
Lundell, the Project Engineer, and to Clifford Corless, 
the State Inspector (Tr. 61 - p. 29, lines 15-16) who was 
there when the drainage ditch was cut, the work was 
staked on May 4, 1972, and the work was done on May 
22,1972 (Tr. 61 - p. 15, lines 12-20 and p. 31, lines 10-25). 
Lundell testified that the drainage ditch was in the 
State's original plans and specifications (Tr. 61 - p. 14, 
lines 29-30 and p. 15, lines 1-6). The State planned to 
build the drainage ditch from the outset, since it was 
in its original plans, and the State directed the Appellant-
Contractor to build it (Tr. 61 - p. 15, lines 7-10). The 
State staked the drainage ditch on May 4, 1972, and the 
work was done on May 22, 1972, in the presence of the 
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State Inspector, Clifford Corless (Tr. 61 - p. 15, lines 
11-20) Lundell testified that the drainage ditch should 
have been completed on May 22, 1972 (Tr. 61 - p. 15, 
lines 21-25). Corless confirmed that the drainage ditch 
was in fact, satisfactorily completed on May 22,1972 (Tr. 
61 - p. 36, line 30 and p. 37, lines 1-8). 
In regard to the fence, Corless, the State Inspector, 
testified that based upon his own personal observation 
on May 22, 1972, three months prior to August 22, 1972, 
the work on the fence, located at Station 143, where the 
drainage ditch was cut, was constructed in accordance 
with the plans and specifications of the State (Tr. 61 -
p. 33, lines 6-30 and p, 34, lines 1-2), i.e., the wire used 
by the Appellant-Contractor was the same specification 
(Tr. 61 - p. 33, lines 6-9), and the wire was tied down 
at the top and the bottom and every other strand, which 
was the same specification as called for by the State (Tr. 
61, - p. 33, lines 25-30 and p. 34, lines 1-2). Corless fur-
ther testified that at the time the ditch was dug on May 
22, 1972, he paid particular attention to the Appellant-
Contractor's work to make sure that the fence was not 
damaged. He confirmed that the fence was not damaged 
at all (Tr. 61 - p. 31, lines 26-30 and p. 32, lines 1-9). In 
conclusion, Corless testified, concerning the fence (Tr. 
61, - p. 36, lines 24-29), as Mows: 
Q. Okay. Down here, (indicating) at Sta-
tion 143, when you were there on May 22, 1972, 
observing the digging of the ditch, was the fence 
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at that particular station complete or was there 
something else that the contractor had to do? 
A. In that area, it was complete. 
There is absolutely no evidence that the Appellant-
Contractor was negligent, as far as the State was con-
cerned, since the Appellant-Contractor constructed the 
fence in accordance with the plans and specifications of 
the State. Even if the Appellant-Contractor was negli-
gent, which Appellant-Contractor strongly denies, as far 
as the State was concerned, the work on the fence had 
been satisfactorily completed in accordance with the plans 
and specifications of the State and, therefore, any lia-
bility to third persons concerning the fence shafted to 
the State upon such satisfactory completion, which Ap-
pellant-Contractor submits was also a practical acceptance 
of the work on the fence. 
In regard to the drainage ditch, Corless, the State 
Inspector, testified that the State had staked the drain-
age ditch on May 4, 1972, and that the Appellant Con-
tractor performed the work of digging the ditch in ac-
cordlance with how it was staked on May 22, 1972 (Tr. 
61 - p. 31, lines 10-25). In conclusion, Mr. Corless testi-
fied, concerning the ditch (Tr. 61 - p. 36, line 30 and 
p. 37, lines 1-8), as follows: 
Q. Okay. Now, with respect to the digging 
of the ditch and the laying of the pipe, when 
was that completed? 
A. It was completed on the 22nd. 
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Q. Of May? 
A. It was completed on five 22, of 72; the 
pipe installation. 
Q. And was there anything left for the 
contractor to do after that date with respect to 
the ditch and the pipe? 
A. Not in my judgment. 
There is absolutely no evidence that the Appellant-
Contractor was negligent in the manner in which it dug 
the ditch since it was dug in accordance with the plans 
and specifications of the State. Mr. Corless was there 
to make sure that the ditch was dug as the State wanted 
it dug and in accordance with the plans and specifications 
of the State. Even if the Appellant-Contractor was neg-
ligent, which Appellant-Contractor strongly denies, as far 
as the State was concerned, the work on the ditch had 
been satisfactorily completed in accordance with the plans 
and specifications of the State and, therefore, any lia-
bility to third persons concerning the ditch shifted to the 
State upon such satisfactory completion, which Appel-
lant-Contractor submits was also a practical acceptance 
of the work on the ditch. 
On cross-examination, Mr. Corless testified that he 
measured the ditch because the State has to pay the 
Appellant-Contractor by the cubic yard and, further, that 
nothing was placed under the fence after the ditch was 
dug because "at the time (May 22, 1972) there was no 
reason to" (Tr. 61 - p. 40, lines 3-10). The ditch was dug 
by the Appellant-Contractor as the State directed it 
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should be dug. The Appellant-Contractor merely fol-
lowed the directions of the State Inspector. The Appel-
lant-Contractor did what a reasonably prudent person 
would have doneunder the same or similar circumstances. 
There was no improper workmanship or failure to per-
form. In Black v. Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc., supra, the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated the law in this regard, as 
follows: 
"A contractor is required to follow the plans and 
specifications and when he does so, he cannot 
be held to guarantee that the work performed 
as required by his contract will be free from de-
fects, or withstand the action of the elements, 
or that the completed job will accomplish the 
purpose intended. He is only responsible for im-
proper workmanship or other faults, or defects 
resulting from his failure to perform.,, 
Thus, if the ditch had eroded away and become much 
deeper, as alleged by Plaintiff-Respondent, the Appellant-
Contracrbor cannot be held responsible because when he 
follows the State's directions (plans and specifications), 
he cannot be held to guarantee that the work will be free 
from defects or withstand the action of the elements or 
that the completed job will accomplish the purpose in-
tended. 
On further cross-examination, Mr. Corless testified 
concerning formal acceptance of the fence (Tr. 61 - p. 
43, lines 12-30 and p. 44, lines 1-10), as follows: 
Q. Did you ever make a formal acceptance 
of this fence? 
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A. Haven't done as of yet. 
Q. And in fact the freeway wasn't com-
pleted until when? 
A. It isn't completed at the present time. 
Q. And did you ever make any acceptance 
of the fence at all? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And would that be one of your responsi-
bilities? 
A. No. That, sir, is the responsibility of 
the project engineer. And I advised him of the 
situation in the field. 
Q. And he relies upon your advice, is that 
right? 
A. Not entirely. There's other people in-
volved. 
Q. And as far as you're concerned you've 
never advised them to accept that fence or any 
part of it as yet, is that right? 
A. Well, the job's never been finaled out, 
and we never accept anything totally until the 
job's completed. 
Q. And whan the job's completed then 
you accept it? 
A. That's right. Then we'll go through on 
a final inspection. And that is sometime to 
come. 
Q. And you haven't inspected it finally as 
yet? 
A. Not the final acceptance. No, sir. 
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Q. That includes the fence, is that right? 
A. That's the project as a whole. 
Q. I say, that includes the fence, does it 
not? 
A. Yes. 
It should be noted that the acceptance referred to 
above it a "formal acceptance" which is made upon "final 
inspection of the whole project" when it is completed 
which Corless said would be some time to come. The 
kind of acceptance Corless testified to above is what the 
courts have referred to as a "formal acceptance" which 
is not required in order to relieve a contractor from lia-
bility to third persons and shift it to the owner or the 
State. The only acceptance necessary, as previously 
stated in the case law, is a practical acceptance (or, we 
submit, satisfactory completion) of the work in question 
which allegedly causes the injury or damage. Surely, as 
stated in Rengstorf v. Winston Bros. Co., supra, where 
injury or damage occurs after "satisfactory completion" 
of the work by the contractor but before formal accept-
ance of the work by the state, to impose a duty upon a 
contractor to continue supervision and care over such 
work when the State has subjected it to use would im-
pose an "impossible result" and an unconscionable bur-
den on a contractor. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in affirming a summary 
judgment granted to a defendant contractor, has stated 
that it "is familiar with the general rule as to the non-
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liability of an independent contractor after acceptance 
of the work by the owner, as well as with the exceptions 
to this rule and the so-called 'modern view', 13 A. L. R. 
2d 195; 58 A. L. R. 2d 869." [Leininger v. Steams-Roger 
Manufacturing Company, 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P. 2d 33 
(1965)3. 
In Leininger, the Supreme Court held that defen-
dant contractor was not liable for injuries sustained in 
an explosion of a fan installed by the contractor accord-
ing to the directions of the owner and as received from 
the manufacturer. If the court had applied the general 
rule, as stated above, to the facts of the case, there would 
have been no question as to the non-liability of the con-
tractor. However, the court went even further and con-
sidered the injured plaintiff's claim under the "modern 
view", the most liberal approach to holding contractors 
liable, and still found that the contractor was not liable. 
The court stated: 
"The so-called modern view has the effect of 
applying the landmark standard promulgated in 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N. Y. 
382, 111 N. E. 1050, L. R. A. 1916F, 696, but does 
not have the effect of making a contractor ab-
solutely liable to third persons if the contractor 
was free of negligence. An important limitation 
on the rule placing building contractors on the 
same footing as sellers of goods is that the con-
tractor is not liable if he has merely carried out 
the plans, specifications and directions given 
him, since in that case the responsibility is as-
sumed by the employer, at least when the plans 
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are not so obviously dangerous that no reason-
able man would follow them." 
The Leininger case is distinguishable from the case 
ait bar in that the Utah court stated that: 
"The insitant case is not one of the contractee 
accepting an instrumentality constructed or re-
paired by the contractor according to a plan or 
design furnished by the contractee to the con-
tractor." 
The case at bar is just such a case and application of the 
general rule, as opposed to the modern view, seems more 
appropriate. 
Based upon a review of the above testimony, certain 
essential facts are clear: 
(1) As far as the State was concerned, the fence 
in question, whether the 1,650 foot segment or the entire 
3,600 foot segment, was satisfactorily completed in the 
early fall of 1971, almost one year prior to August 22, 
1972. The Appellant-Contractor built the fence in ac-
cordance with the plans and specifications of the State. 
There was nothing left for the Appellant-Contractor to 
do on the fence after the early fall of 1971, and the Ap-
pellant-Contractor removed his equipment and was no 
longer in charge or control of the fence after the early 
fall of 1971. The fence was turned over to the State in 
the early fall of 1971 and no further work was done on 
the fence nor did the State request the Appellant-Con-
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tractor to do any further work on the fence since that 
time. 
(2) As far as the State was concerned, the ditch 
in question was satisfactorily completed no May 22, 1972, 
three months prior to August 22, 1972. The Appellant-
Contractor dug the ditch, in the presence of the State 
Inspector, as it was staked and in accordance with the 
plans and specifications as it was directed to do by the 
State. There was nothing left for the Appellant-Con-
tractor to do on the ditch after May 22, 1972, and the 
Appellant-Contractor removed his equipment and was no 
longer in charge or control of the ditch after May 22, 
1972. The ditch was turned over to the State on May 
22, 1972, and no further work was done on the ditch nor 
did the State request the Appellant-Contractor to do 
any further work on the ditch since that time. 
Based upon the above facts, it is clear that Plaintiff-
Respondent has not met his burden of showing (1) that 
the Appellant-Contractor was negligent (as far as the 
State was concerned the Appellant-Contractor performed 
the work in accordance with the plans and specifications) 
and (2) that the Appellant-Contractor was still in charge 
and control of the work on August 22, 1972, and that 
there had not been a satisfactory completion or practical 
acceptance of the work by the State. 
Therefore, since the Plaintiff-Respondent failed to 
meet his burden, it is submitted that the trial court 
should have determined that Appellant-Contractor was 
not negligent — he did not fail to do what a reasonably 
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prudent man would have done in the same or similar 
circumstances — he merely followed the directions of 
the State and performed his work in accordance with the 
State's plans and specifications. 
Assuming for purposes of argument only that Ap-
pellant-Contractor was negligent in performing his work, 
which Appellant-Contractor strongly denies, even then, 
it is respectfully submitted that the trial court should 
have determined that Appellant-Contractor's duty to 
Plaintiff-Respondent, a third person, ended and shifted 
to the State, as far as the fence is concerned, upon satis-
factory completion in the early fall of 1971, almost a 
year prior to August 22, 1972, and as far as the ditch is 
concerned, ended and shifted to the State upon satis-
factory completion on May 22, 1972, three months prior 
to August 22, 1972. Thus, on August 22, 1972, when 
the bull and cow allegedly got out under the fence 
through the ditch, Appellant-Contractor owed no duty 
to the Plaintiff-Respondent, a third person. The duty, 
from the time of satisfactory completion, rested upon 
the State. 
To have allowed this case to go to the jury on the 
above facts allowed the jury to impose an unconscionable 
burden on the Appellant-Contractor and cause an im-
possible result (i.e., even though the Appellant-Contrac-
tor had completed its work exactly as the State wanted 
it done and even though the State had accepted that 
work, the jury was allowed to impose a continuing duty 
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on the Appellant-Contractor to remain responsible for 
the work). 
Therefore, as set forth in the Restatement of the 
Law, Second, Torts, § 328B, when the court determines 
whether there are facts sufficient to give rise to a legal 
duty on the part of the Appellant-Contractor, we submit 
that the trial court should have determined (1) that 
there was no negligence on the part of the Appellant-
Contractor and, hence, no duty; and ()2 that even if 
there was negligence, a conclusion which the facts do 
not support, the Appellant-Contractor's duty to third 
persons suffering injury or damages because of its work 
ended and shifted to the State upon satisfactory com-
pletion or practical acceptance of the work which, as far 
as the State was concerned, the entity to whom the duty 
shifts, the duty should have shifted in early fall of 1971 
on the fence and May 22, 1972, on the ditch, both of 
which were long before August 22, 1972, the date on 
which Plaintiff-Respondent allegedly suffered damage or 
injury because of the work on the fence and ditch. 
It is further submitted that when the trial court 
determined whether the evidence as to the facts made 
an issue upon which a jury may reasonably find the ex-
istence or non-existence of such facts, which determina-
tion is not necessary if the above question concerning 
duty is determined as set forth above, the trial court 
should have concluded that there were no such facts 
since the facts set forth above in the testimony of the 
two State officials is uncontroverted (1) insofar as the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
Appellant-Contractor following the plans and specifica-
tions of the State is concerned, and (2) insofar as the 
dates of satisfactory completion by the Appellant-Con-
tractor or practical acceptance by the State is concerned. 
It is submitted that based upon the above facts and 
law, this case should have been decided by the court as 
a matter of law in favor of the Appellant-Contractor and 
against the Plaintiff-Respondent by reason of the fact 
that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a jury 
verdict and because such a jury verdict would be and 
was contrary to law. 
At some point, the contractor's liability to third per-
sons must end. Whether one wishes to view the matter 
from a policy standpoint or talk in terms of "proximate 
cause" and foreseeability", the result is the same. 
Approached from a policy standpoint, it seems logical 
to relieve the contractor of liability at that point where 
he is no longer in practical control of the physical object 
in question, providing no hidden defects are present. It 
seems even more logical that where the contractor merely 
follows plans and specifications furnished him by the 
State, and over which he can exercise no discretion what-
ever, that his liability to third persons, would be not only 
remote, but non-existent. 
If the circumstances of the case are analyzed from 
the standpoint of causation, it seems equally clear that 
defendant's conduct was not the legal cause of the plain-
tiff's damage. Where the contractor merely followed the 
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plans and specifications of the State, and a State Inspec-
tor stood by while the work was being performed, the 
proximate cause of the injury would be more logically 
attributable to defects in the plans and specifications 
themselves. Neither was it foreseeable to the contractor, 
who acted prudently and reasonably, that his perform-
ance of the work in accordance with those plans would 
be the cause of the injury complained of in this instance. 
To say that Appellant-Contractor, W. W. Clyde & 
Company, remained liable for work satisfactorily com-
pleted and subsequently inspected by the State and 
accepted as complete, would be to impose an impossible 
burden on the contractor of "policing" all prior work done 
in conjunction with the State for an indefinite number 
of years to follow. As a matter of law, the contractor 
should not be held to such an impossible standard of 
care. 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF THE COURT DETERMINED 
THAT THERE WAS A JURY QUESTION 
AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE APPEL-
LANT-CONTRACTOR MAY HAVE BEEN 
NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO FOLLOW THE 
PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH AND EVEN IF THE 
COURT DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS 
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A JURY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR 
NOT THERE HAD BEEN A PRACTICAL 
ACCEPTANCE BY THE STATE OF UTAH 
OF THE APPELLANT-CONTRACTOR'S 
WORK IN THE AREA IN QUESTION, THE 
C O U R T ERRED IN FAILING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY AS TO WHAT CON-
STITUTES A PRACTICAL ACCEPTANCE. 
After both parties had rested their cases, counsel 
for the Appellant-Contractor made a Motion for a Di-
rected Verdict and requested the opportunity to present 
the law and argue the same before considering the court's 
instructions and before submission of the case to the 
jury. The court, in chambers, advised counsel for the 
Appellant-Contractor that no matter what the law was, 
the court would take the Motion for a Directed Verdict 
under advisement and submit the case to the jury. The 
court then provided counsel with its instructions. Coun-
sel for Appellant-Contractor prevailed upon the court 
to at least add to Instruction No. 10 on the law that "the 
acceptance need not be a formal acceptance, but a prac-
tical acceptance is sufficient" (Tr. 46). The court re-
fused to hear any argument from counsel as to the need 
to define what is meant by a "practical acceptance" nor 
to even be informed as to the law in this area, prior to 
instructing the jury. 
After the court had instructed the jury and the jury 
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had retired to deliberate on the matter, the court made 
the following statement: 
"The Court: All right, Mr. Morgan, you indi-
cated that you wanted to make a motion, and 
you in the presence of opposing counsel stated 
to the court the nature of that motion, and the 
court said that it would under any circumstances 
take that motion under advisement. But I want 
to give you an opportunity now to make the 
motion formally. We'll consider as though you 
made it prior to the time that the jury was in-
structed. And make what record you care to 
with respect to it" (Tr. 63 - p. 1, lines 22-30). 
[Emphasis added.] 
"Mr. Morgan: Would the Court hear me out 
on the law then at this time as well, or would 
the Court prefer that I — 
The Court: Well, we don't need an extended 
argument with regard to it, but / will before I 
rule on it ultimately hear you out on the law" 
(Tr. 63 - p. 2, lines 1-6). [Emphasis added.] 
Thereafter, counsel for the Appellant-Contractor in-
formed the court as to the law in this area of "practical 
acceptance" by citing some of the cases as set forth in 
58 A. L. R. 2d 876-878 and 13 A. L. R. 2d 211-212 (Tr. 
63 - pp. 2-4) after which the court made the following 
statement: 
"The Court: It may be a law matter rather than 
a jury question. We have made it a jury ques-
tion, and we didn't tell them what 'practical ac-
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ceptance' means. And frankly I don't know 
what it means. 
* * * * * 
The Court: And if the lawyers and the judges 
and the Supreme Court can't tell what a practical 
acceptance is, how is this jury going to do it?" 
(Tr. 63 - p. 4, lines 21-24, 29-30 and p. 5, line 
1). [Emphasis added.] 
It is apparent from the above that the court, after 
having been informed as to the law (which it refused 
to hear before instructing the jury), finally realized that 
the question of whether or not there had been a "practi-
cal acceptance" by the State of Utah of the Appellant-
Contractor's work on the drainage ditch and fence may 
well have been (and should have been) a question of 
law to be decided by the court, as it was in the cases 
cited by counsel for the Appellant-Contractor, especially 
in light of the facts in the case at bar. 
The court further recognized for the first time (be-
cause it had failed to hear the law earlier) that even if 
the question of whether or not there had been a "practi-
cal acceptance" of the Appellant-Contractor's work by 
the State of Utah was one that should be decided by the 
jury, since the court had failed to advise the jury by in-
struction what acts would constitute a "practical accept-
ance", it could not expect that any real consideration 
would be given by the jury as to whether there had been 
a "practical acceptance" by the State of Utah of the 
Appellant-Contractor's work. 
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Thus, it is clear that the jury decided the subject 
case, not on the basis of whether or not there had been 
a "practical acceptance" by the State of Utah of the 
Appellant-Contractor's work on the drainage ditch and 
fence, but simply on the basis of whether or not the 
Plaintiff-Respondent's bull and cow got out under the 
fence through the drainage ditch. 
It is not difficult to conceive that the court com-
pounded its error in refusing to grant Appellant-Con-
tractor's Motion for Directed Verdict which it had taken 
under advisement because the court was reluctant to 
overturn the jury verdict. Notwithstanding the court's 
commitment to counsel for the Appellant-Contractor to 
"ultimately hear you out on the law", the court decided 
the Motion for a Directed Verdict which was joined with 
a Motion for a New Trial, or in the Alternative, Judg-
ment Notwithstanding the Verdict, without any further 
oral argument on the matter. 
It is submitted that the court erred in submitting 
the question of whether or not there had been a "practi-
cal acceptance" by the State of Utah of the Appellant-
Contractor's work and compounded that error after sub-
mitting the question by not informing the jury as to 
what constitutes a "practical acceptance". 
CONCLUSION 
The Judgment entered in the trial court with respect 
to the Second Cause of Action for One Thousand Nine 
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Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($1,900.00), plus costs for 
damages caused Plaintiff-Respondent for the loss of his 
Charlois bull and Hereford cow should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORGAN, SCALLEY, 
LUNT & KESLER 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN 
Attorney for 
Defendant and Appellant 
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